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*returning momentarily to our discussion of terminology: within a single paragraph in the syllabus for the National War College's course on Statecraft~ "containment" is referred to as a "new approach," a "doctrine," a "balance of power policy," and a "grand strategy."
"Strategy" is the most often used term, and probably the most commonly accepted, but "policy" appears to be the most logically correct. The question of how to accommodate the reality of nuclear weapons was also a matter of the ascendancy of technology.
Represented most outwardly by the theology of strategic air power and the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear issues dominated national security strategy to the extent that they supplanted even the other aspects of military strategy.
The pursuit of the means required to make the nuclear threat credible became a virtual end in itself, spawning a number of inter-Service disputes in the process.
Unfortunately, reliance on nuclear force proscribed United
States ability to react with discriminate force to contingencies such as the uprising in Hungary in 1956 (whether we wanted to or not), much less to small "brushfire wars" and insurgencles which were occurring with ever more frequency in the third world. In short, the asymmetric strategy of massive retaliation did not effectively support the policy of contalnment--a new approach was needed. The option of regional nuclear war proved a mixed blessing.
On the one hand, it demonstrated the indivisibility of the American nuclear umbrella and created nuclear alternatives short of general war.
On the other hand, it tied American strategy to the behavior of its allies and opened the question of whether American guarantees had any meaning when the survival of the United States was at risk. 13
The concept is certainly in question today. Despite their overwhelming implications, nuclear weapons cannot be the end-all and be-all of American foreign policy.
The nuclear rationale has been steadily eroded over the years by steady improvements in the size and quality of the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The credibility of deterrence, at least at the theater level, is in serious jeopardy--both the will of the United States to use nuclear weapons, as well as the Soviet perception of that will, 
